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"Billy, listen to me, white men cant jump."
Sydney Deane
1 Introduction
Biases shaped by psychological dispositions and social norms or interactions are commonly
recognized as important determinants of economic decision making and market outcomes.
Becker (1957) and Arrow (1972) provide models depicting such biases in the context of dis-
crimination while Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984) study the persistence of customs. Most
of the evidence on the e¤ects of biases, comes from studies aiming to detect discrimination
in labor markets (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), in access to services (e.g., Page,
1995), and in access to resources, most notably credit (e.g., Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and
McEneaney, 1996; Pope and Sydnor, 2011). But the study of biases go beyond discrimination:
a related literature documents systematic deviations from standard assumptions underlying
economic behavior and links them to psychological and social factors.1 Challenges remain in
both strands of the literature: documenting whether discrimination exists rather than the ob-
served di¤erences stemming from unobserved heterogeneity, distinguishing information-based
discrimination (Phelps, 1972) from taste-based discrimination, and understanding whether
and how behavioral biases carry over from laboratory experiments to real markets as well as
whether and how they persist instead of market forces eliminating such biases.
This paper o¤ers new insights into these challenges by studying the e¤ects of psychologically-
based, socially-reinforced beliefs in a nancial market setting. In particular, we examine the
relationship between National Basketball Association (NBA) betting outcomes and the race
of the participants, in order to uncover how biases can a¤ect market outcomes. This is an
ideal setting to expand our knowledge on the economics of biases for several reasons.
First, the NBA betting markets provide advantages that other settings, including other
nancial market settings, cannot. Specically, bettors pay for their biases à la Becker. Hence,
decisions based on biases are punished with direct pecuniary losses. This is in contrast to
1See Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004) and DellaVigna (2009) for a review.
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studies of the impact of biases in psychology and sociology literatures, where most evidence
relies on experiments or surveys with no immediate, explicit, pecuniary gains or losses for
the participants. In addition, unlike most nancial markets, the sports betting markets
contain well-dened prices, well-dened outcomes, readily accessible information, and a nite
time horizon. Therefore, the usual caveats associated with measurement problems (e.g.,
dening the horizon over which returns should be measured) and asymmetric information do
not apply. Moreover, the actions and outcomes are repeated with a signicant degree of
frequency, providing an opportunity to test whether the bias persists or disappears as market
participants strive to learn about biases and compete to grasp arbitrage opportunities.
Second, the bias in the market we study is easily recognized since some of the most
deeply held ideas about race and racial di¤erence are expressed in one of the most well-known
stereotypes: the natural black athlete, and especially, the black basketball star.2 The common
stereotype of the black basketball player is so evident that the term "the black game" was
coined to refer to the sport (George, 1999). What makes it so di¢ cult to counter the argument
that blacks have an innate ability to play basketball is that there appears to be evidence to
support it: roughly 70% of NBA players are black. For economists, an interesting question is
then whether such a stereotype a¤ects economic decision making and market outcomes, thus
challenging the rationality tenet in its standard form.
Hence, in our setting, market outcomes are objective, common knowledge, determined
within a nite time, repeated regularly, and there exists a widely-familiar, biased view of the
participants. Our data consists of the outcomes of NBA games and the Las Vegas point
spreads on these games, from the 1993-94 season through the 2007-08 season.3 Betting on
NBA basketball generally involves a point spread wager, where the bet wins based on the
relationship between the nal score and the point spread. The team covers the spread if a
bet on the team pays. To illustrate, if the spread is +3.5 for the home team, an $11 bet on
2For instance, see Biernat and Manis (1994) and Sailes (1996).
3Note that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA) imposes a federal ban
on sports betting in all states with the exception of Delaware, Nevada, Montana, and Oregon. These four
states already had sports betting laws on their books when the Congress passed PASPA and were permitted
to o¤er parlay-type sports betting. Nevada, however, is the only state that allows all types of sports betting,
on any professional or amateur sports games, in any capacity.
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the home team would pay $21 if either the home team won the game or lost by 3 points or
less. An $11 bet on the visiting team would pay $21 only if the visiting team won by 4 points
or more. In this setting, the point spread is a market-based estimate of the realized margin
(the nal score of the home team minus the nal score of the visiting team).4
Our analysis examines whether there is evidence that biases, embodied as stereotypes
about a certain group of participants, have an impact on nancial decisions by examining
how the point spread and the performance against the spread in NBA betting markets varies
with the racial composition of the teams.
We ask whether there is a bias on betting on teams that are "more black." If so, this
bias would manifest itself such that the spread on the more black team would be higher than
it should be, leading to a negative relationship between the fraction of black players and the
performance against the spread. Further, if we make an auxiliary assumption that bettors
are expected value maximizers, then such a bias would imply that, on average, bettors have
(possibly subconscious) beliefs that "more black" teams are better than "less black" teams.
We nd that the point spreads are higher for teams with a relatively higher fraction of
black players. We also nd that the probability of beating the spread decreases as the
fraction of black players increases. Our results are robust to alternate measures of the racial
composition of the team: the number of black players starting the game, the number of black
players on the roster, and the minutes played by black players in recent games. Additionally,
if we make the auxiliary assumption that bettors are expected value maximizers, then we
can conclude that, all things equal, "more black" teams look better than "less black" teams.
We refer to this as a monetary bias. However, without the auxiliary assumption, we cannot
rule out the possibility of a non-monetary bias towards betting on more black teams. For
instance, bettors could have a bias for betting on "popular" or "exciting" teams, or teams
with "cool" or "style" or "it" and these are simply related to race. We refer to this as a
non-monetary bias, since the bettors are not necessarily betting on the team that they deem
more likely to win the bet.
4In terms of the timing of bets placed, the betting typically opens less than 24 hours before the start of
the game and, needless to say, closes when the game begins.
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There are two hypotheses for the cause of the relationship between race and the point
spread. It could be that biased bettors place more money on the more black team, thus
causing the spread to move from an unbiased spread to a biased spread.5 Or it could be
the case that the bookmakers are aware of the bias of bettors, and set the spread in order
to extract more surplus. Why would bookmakers set a biased spread? Levitt (2004) shows
that bookmakers can increase their earnings if bettors have a bias. This is because the
bookmakers can set the point spread in a manner such that more than half of the money is
bet on the outcome that wins less than half of the time. In order to distinguish between
these hypotheses, we use a second data set containing the opening and closing point spreads,
for the 2003-04 season through the 2009-10 season.
Our results show that the movement of the spread is not related to the racial composition
of the teams in a robust manner. Hence, it appears to be the case that the bookmakers know
of the bias towards more black teams and consider this when they set the spread. This is
further supported by evidence that a larger fraction of money is bet on the more black team.
To gain intuition for our results, we o¤er the following discussion. Here we make the
auxiliary assumption that bettors are expected value maximizers. In other words, they
exhibit a monetary but not a non-monetary bias.6 Consider two teams that are exactly as
good as each other. Consequently both teams will win with a probability of 0.5. However,
one team is more black than the other. Therefore, some people will have a, possibly
subconscious, belief that the black team is better and deem their probability of winning to be
greater than 0.5, despite that the truthis 0.5. To exploit this bias, rather than setting the
spread as a pick-em (spread of 0), the bookmaker sets the spread in favor of the black team
at a value di¤erent from 0. This means that (all things equal) the black team will cover the
spread with a probability less than 0.5, making this a worse bet. This reasoning still holds
5Gandar et al. (1998) nd that bettors move the initial point spread in a manner that improves the spread
as a prediction of the outcome of the game.
6Here we make this assumption because, in our view, it makes the intuition easier to grasp. If, on the
other hand, bettors do not have a non-monetary bias, the same sorts of arguments apply, except that the
discussion is framed, not in terms of judgments of better or worse at basketball, but rather in terms of the
nature of the non-monetary bias. It is for this reason that the assumption of expected value maximization
renders this discussion more transparent.
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when the teams are not as good as each other. In this case, there is a true spreadwhere
both teams will cover with probability 0.5. But the bookmakers do not set the spread at the
true spread but rather the true spread adjusted by a few points for the black team. Again,
the black team covers with probability less than 0.5.
Let us return to the case where both teams are equally good, so the expected nal margin
is zero. Further, let us assume that the spread at which an even amount of money would be
placed both sides of the bet would be -3 for the more black team. In this case, since half of the
money is on either side of the bet, the bookmakersexpected payo¤ is determined exclusively
by the betting cost: for every $11 bet, the winner gets $21, that is, a return of $10 and not
$11. Similarly if the spread is set at 0, the bookmakersexpected payo¤ is again determined
exclusively by the betting cost.7 The prot-maximizing spread is somewhere between 0 and
-3. So, the bookmakers set the spread at, say, -2 and more money is bet on the black team
because the median bettor thinks that the spread should be -3. Since more than half of the
money is bet on the outcome that occurs less than half the time, the bookmakers earn extra
prots.
We consider various non-racial bias alternate explanations for our results, however the
racial bias remains signicant in each specication. Our results imply that biases can indeed
inuence behavior in nancial settings. Hence, we contribute to the literature by providing
evidence that economic decision making is altered by conscious or subconscious categorization
based on observable characteristics, e.g., race and gender. Additionally, the association
between the point spread ("the price") and the racial composition of the teams (a variable
that is not systematically related to the winning ability of a team and is observable prior to
the bets being placed) creates protable opportunities that involve betting on the "whiter"
team.8 In other words, the bias is su¢ ciently large and persistent that we are able to identify
a means of proting from the biased market outcomes.
7For more on this, see Levitt (2004).
8Perhaps with slight abuse of the term, we use "white" to refer to all non-black players.
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2 Background
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. The rst of these strands examines biases
and their impact on economic outcomes. A large number of studies look at discrimination,
where outcomes are a¤ected by characteristics such as gender and race. Because of the
ine¢ ciencies discrimination can create and the potential policy implications, it is of great
interest to identify settings in which biases exist and, once they are identied, to specify the
mechanism that is causing the bias.9 Often, it is very di¢ cult to nd unambiguous evidence
of biased outcomes, mostly due to the omitted variables problem. That is, ruling out the
possibility that the observed variation may be a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity,
which is also correlated with the object of study (in many cases, gender or race), is a di¢ cult
task.10 In response to this problem, some researchers have used audit studies whereby the
investigators send identical treatments into the eld, with the exception that they di¤er on the
basis of, say, race. Then the researchers seek to observe di¤erences in behavior that could only
have been driven by race. For instance, in their inuential study, Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) sent otherwise identical resumes to potential employers, where some applicants had
"white" names and some had "black" names. The authors found that applicants with black
names were less likely to receive a callback for an interview than were the applicants with
white names.
Audit studies, such as this one, have proven to be useful in identifying bias.11 There are
however, some drawbacks.12 First, it is argued (Heckman, 1998) that these studies overstate
the e¤ect of discrimination because they do not account for the e¤ects of unbiased people on
the market outcomes. In other words, these audit studies can identify that some behave in
a biased fashion, however it is possible that the unbiased people can behave in a way that
9For more on discrimination literature, see, among others, Altonji and Blank (1999), Ross and Yinger
(2002), and Charles and Guryan (2008).
10There is a literature that examines whether there is racial discrimination in the salaries of professional
basketball players. For instance, see Kahn and Sherer (1988), Hoang and Rascher (1999), Hill (2004), Kahn
and Shah (2005), Groothuis and Hill (2011), and Ajilore (2014). Of course, it is di¢ cult to measure individual
productivity in a team setting and therefore the results in this literature are not uncontroversial. However,
our paper does not su¤er from the same di¢ culty as a team either covers the bet or it does not.
11See Ayers and Siegelman (1995) for another example of this type of technique.
12For more on the di¢ culties with audit studies, see Yinger (1998).
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mitigates the e¤ects of the behavior of the biased people. Our paper is not vulnerable to
this criticism because the object of our study is not individual behavior but rather market
outcomes and we nd that the market outcomes are biased. Second, to our knowledge,
audit studies are not repeated whereby the decision maker can learn about the unobserved
heterogeneity of the subject. Again, we are not vulnerable to this objection because we have
a considerable number of observations for the same players and teams, whereby the e¤ects of
the unobserved heterogeneity could be learned. We nd that the market is systematically
biased though there are learning opportunities and there are pecuniary costs to behaving in
this biased fashion.
Of particular relevance to our paper, Stone, Perry and Darley (1997) directed subjects
to listen to an audio clip of a basketball game after viewing a picture of the player whom
they were instructed to judge. The subjects who were shown a picture of a black player
rated the performance as better than those subjects who were shown a picture of a white
player.13 While existing experiments are suggestive of biases in judgments involving race and
athletic performance, since the accuracy of these judgments are not related to the material
incentives of the subjects, it can be di¢ cult to interpret these results. However, our study
is not vulnerable to this critique because obviously betting on the outcome of a basketball
game is indeed related to a persons material incentives. On the other hand, this literature is
consistent with the monetary bias explanation for our results, in that it provides laboratory
evidence of a racial bias in the assessment of talent and performance in basketball.
Our paper also relates to the literature documenting and explaining market anomalies in
nance. Closely related to our premise of studying the impact of perception in a nancial
market setting, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) look at case
of the "sin stocks" and political values in investment decisions. Wolfers (2006a) examines
the stock market returns of companies with female CEOs.
Sports betting markets, in particular, provide an attractive ground for testing market e¢ -
ciency because, unlike most nancial markets, the sports betting markets contain well-dened
prices, well-dened outcomes and a nite time horizon. In particular, sports betting mar-
13Also see, Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, and Darley (1999).
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kets have outcomes that are realized within a short time frame, are observable by all market
participants, and are unambiguous (no measurement error or uncertainty about the horizon
over which outcomes should be measured). Finally, due to the widespread availability of
information, these markets are unlikely to have uninformed traders. Therefore, the questions
related to the e¢ ciency of the sports betting markets are of interest to economists in testing
market e¢ ciency hypotheses.
Echoing ndings in other nancial markets, several studies have found ine¢ ciencies in
the sports betting markets.14 For instance, studies have found evidence consistent with the
explanation that bettors erroneously place bets for sentimental reasons (Avery and Chevalier,
1999; Braun and Kvasnicka, 2013; Forrest and Simmons, 2008), on teams that are deemed
"hot" (Brown and Sauer, 1993; Camerer, 1989), on teams that are "popular" (Feddersen,
Humphreys, and Soebbing, 2013), and on teams that are favorites (Golec and Tamarkin, 1991;
Grey and Grey, 1997). Levitt (2004) nds, using data on the wagers placed by bettors as part
of a handicapping contest o¤ered at an online sports book, that the amount of money placed
on each side of the bet is not equal and this imbalance is related to observable information. In
particular, Levitt nds that the proportion of money bet is higher for favorites and road teams.
The author argues that the bookmakers set the spread in order to exploit common biases:
people like favorites and people do not su¢ ciently account for the home eld advantage.15
Others have also looked at the e¤ect of race on outcomes in sports. Again, this literature is
signicant beyond the sports context because it involves decisions that exhibit large incentives
for success or accuracy, and the outcomes can be objectively measured. Price and Wolfers
(2010) nd a negative relationship between the personal fouls assessed against NBA players
and the number of own-race referees who o¢ ciated the game. Similarly, Parsons, Sulaeman,
Yates, and Hamermesh (2011) nd that the likelihood of a called strike in baseball is related
to the agreement of the pitchers and umpires race. Although these judgments are made
by well-trained and experienced professionals, they are also made under great duress and
14See Barberis and Thaler (2002) for a general overview and Sauer (1998) for applications in sports betting.
15Paul and Weinbach (2011) corroborate this nding using the percentage of bets actually placed on NFL
games. Our analysis shows that the bets on NBA games are also distorted by racial stereotypes. Also see
Kuypers (2000). Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) discuss the evidence that, in the odds betting of horse racing,
bettors have a bias towards betting on longshots rather than on favorites.
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must be made almost instantaneously. Therefore, it is possible that these biases, while
of great signicance, would be attenuated if they were made under di¤erent circumstances.
By contrast, the decisions that comprise our data are made by individuals who have the
opportunity to reect on the merits of their decisions. Hence, our ndings imply that racial
stereotypes may a¤ect decisions, even when they are made under an extended period of
deliberation.
Finally, Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) nd that the relationship between race and fouls
documented in Price and Wolfers (2010) is signicant enough so that, given information about
the race of the referees and the relative racial composition of the teams, one could improve
their chances of placing a winning bet against the spread. By contrast, we focus primarily on
the racial composition of the teams. Hence, the bias we examine emerges from a more simple
bias for betting on the more black team, rather than the less visible notion that the referees
exhibit an own-race bias. Finally, as does Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008), we o¤er an
analysis of a simple betting strategy. The simple betting strategy proposed by Larsen, Price,
and Wolfers (2008) involves the interaction of the di¤erences in the race of the teams and the
referees, and in our case it is exclusively a function of the racial composition of the teams.
Hence, arguably, our strategy requires less information and is less computationally-intensive
than theirs. Our betting strategies prove to be at least as protable, and often more so,
than the ones analyzed in Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008). We view our work as o¤ering
a complementary investigation into the relationship between race and market outcomes.
3 Data
Our baseline dataset combines box score information on all regular season NBA games played
from the 1993-94 season to the 2007-08 season. We exclude the playo¤ games since the
outcomes for these games tend to be path-dependent, not only across games in the same series
but also across rounds, thus accentuating the survivorship bias in that the number of player
or team observations would depend on their past performance. The box score information is
obtained at the player-game level from www.basketball-reference.com, which also keeps track
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of draft picks and other background information of the players, such as the height and weight.
The ultimate team-game level dataset is constructed from these player-by-player observations.
One crucial variable for our analysis that is missing from the www.basketball-reference.com
website is the race of the players. In some cases (mostly for players who are still active), a
picture of the player accompanies the statistics but this happens only at a small fraction of the
overall player universe during our sample period. Hence, we conduct an extensive search to ob-
tain information on the race of the players, navigating www.nba.com, www.hoopedia.nba.com,
www.draftreview.com, and images found via Google. This information enables us, by visual
inspection, to characterize the racial membership of the players. Admittedly, we use a rather
coarse denition of race by assigning players into two broad categories of black and white,
where white includes Caucasians, Asians, and Latinos. Yet, in order to ensure robustness of
the results, we use several measures of the racial composition of the team. Further, we also
double-check our classication of the racial membership of the players against that used in
Price and Wolfers (2010). The discrepancy between the racial classication exists for a mere
31 out of 1128 matched players. This di¤erence corresponds to only 2.5 percent of the more
than a quarter of a million player-game observations used in our dataset.
The data for the point spreads are obtained from www.goldsheet.com. We verify the
accuracy of the spreads from this source against other sources commonly-used in the acad-
emic studies of sports betting, such as www.covers.com, and nd no signicant discrepancies.
In fact, information on the ultimate outcomes of the games tends to be more accurate in
www.goldsheet.com than it is in www.covers.com. Of the 41 cases when a discrepancy be-
tween the two sources exists, the cross-check with www.espn.com conrms that the former
has the correct information 80 percent of the time. In the absence of an obvious third source
to check the point spreads against, we ultimately use the two data sources as cross-checks
against each other in constructing our nal dataset and eliminate the observations in which
a discrepancy exists.
A total of 18,450 regular-season games were played during the sample period. After
excluding games for which there is a missing box score or racial composition data, we are left
with 17,178 games. Further, after excluding games for which there was either no betting
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information or contradictory betting information, or where the betting outcome was a push,
leading to cancellation of all bets (which occurs approximately 1.3 percent of the time), we
are left with 14,785 games in the sample. Before we move to the formal analysis, we present
some descriptive statistics of this nal dataset.
Of the 1021 players who were active in the NBA during our sample period, 71.8 percent
are black. Black players are even more over-represented in the starting line-up of the teams:
on average, only one out of ve starters is white. In a typical game, each team utilizes 9 to 11
players, 8 of which are, on average, black. As a result, at the player-game level, 76.7 percent
of the minutes are played by black players. These statistics conrm the casual observation
of the dominance of black players in the NBA, not only by sheer number but also by the
visibility they obtain by playing more minutes.
At the player-game level, some di¤erences between black and white players are statistically
signicant. However, it is not always the case that black players have "more desirable
qualities" and the magnitudes of these di¤erences are not economically meaningful. For
instance, while, on average, black players score roughly two points more than their white
counterparts, they are not as e¢ cient, as demonstrated by their slightly lower eld goal
percentages. According to these metrics, black players overall do not appear to be much
better than their white peers. If the quality of the team is related to the individual quality of
the players, there seems to be no statistical reason to deem more black teams to be better.16
We summarize the information on betting spreads and the racial composition at the team-
game level (on which we conduct the primary analysis) in Table 1. Racial composition is
measured by three alternative metrics: the number of black starters, the number of black
players on the team roster regardless of whether they actually play in a game, and the minutes
played by black players. This nal metric is calculated as the average of the past ve games
the team has played and is expressed as a percentage of the total minutes in the game. To
avoid duplication, all variables are expressed from the home teams perspective. Simple
statistics point to a slight advantage for the home team as they win the game 60 percent of
the time, by an average margin of approximately 4 points. Point spreads appear to take this
16A summary of this analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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into account, at least partially, because the home team is the favorite about 70 percent of the
time and beats the spread 51 percent of the time.17
We complement this information on the closing spreads with information on the opening
spreads and the percent of bets placed on each side of the bet from the 2003-04 season
through the 2009-10 season. These data were obtained, at a fee, at www.sportsbetting.com.
This website compiles information from Las Vegas and online sports books, and reports the
opening and closing lines and percent of money wagered on home versus the visiting team.
The reported gures are the median for the opening and closing lines while the percent of
money wagered is computed by summing the individual book numbers. From this data set
we have 7977 observations of opening lines and 8011 observations of the fraction of money
bet on the teams.
4 Analysis
4.1 Accuracy of point spreads and the link between race and win-
ning probability
Our empirical approach rests on a baseline specication where the probability that the home
team beats the spread is a function of the racial composition of the team relative to its
opponent. This relies on two assumptions and, before moving on to the main analysis, we
conrm that these assumptions hold.
The rst assumption is that basketball betting markets are, in general, e¢ cient, in that
any observable information should be reected in the spread. So, we begin our analysis by
looking at the accuracy of point spreads in forecasting the game outcome. We nd that the
"forecast errors," dened as the realized margin minus the point spread18 closely resemble a
normal distribution with zero mean.19
17Note that the partial o¤set of the home court advantage is in line with earlier studies showing a similar
bias in NFL betting markets (Levitt, 2004).
18See Wolfers (2006b) who examines the distribution of errors in college basketball games and nds evidence
of point shaving in games with a large point spread.
19Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test as well as skewness and kurtosis test for normality
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The second assumption is that the probability of winning a game does not increase in the
relative blackness of the teams. Table 2 presents the results of a regression analysis where the
more black team in a match-up is shown not to have a systematically higher probability of
winning a game. The sign on the variables of interest, i.e., blackness of the home team relative
to the visiting team, varies from one specication to the next and is not always signicant
and positive when the dependent variable is the realized margin on the game (upper panel in
Table 2). Therefore, there is little evidence of a positive association between the blackness of
the teams and the decisiveness of the nal scores. A quick glance at the table would suggest a
somewhat robust negative relationship between the blackness of the teams and the probability
of winning (lower panel in Table 2).20 It should be noted that this is not necessarily a sign of
lower quality or generally worse performance of teams composed of more black players against
teams with more white players. Rather, in these specications, the relative blackness of a
team may be capturing the e¤ect of other factors that determine the performance of one team
against another. Indeed, once factors such as the record of the team up to a specic game
in a season is controlled for, the magnitude and signicance of this coe¢ cient is weakened.21
In summary, our assumption that the probability of winning a game does not increase with
the di¤erences in racial composition towards blackness has support in the data.
The verication of these two assumptions are important since it conrms that the NBA
betting markets incorporate all observable and unobservable factors that help predict the
outcome of a game and that the blackness of a team does not increase its chances of winning.
Hence, concerns that the blackness may be related to unobserved skill levels that determine
the outcome of a game do not appear to nd support in the data. With these two assumptions
veried, we now proceed to the regression analysis of point spreads.
further verify that forecast errors are normally distributed. Results of these tests are available from the
authors upon request.
20Notice that the team with more black starters is likely to have a larger realized margin but a lower
probability of winning. While this seems a bit curious, it is consistent with a few outliers where the team with
more black starters had a blowout when they won. Also note that the association between the di¤erences
in the blackness of the teams and the realized margin of the game is not robust as the positive signicant
coe¢ cient disappears when alternative measures of blackness are used.
21These results are not presented here, but are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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4.2 Race and point spreads
Table 3 presents our main ndings. Our analysis shows that teams that are more black tend
to face higher point spreads and that these teams exhibit a worse performance against the
spread. In each regression, team xed e¤ects and season xed e¤ects, as well as team-season
interactions are employed.22 Hence, neither the time-invarying team characteristics nor the
team-invarying time e¤ects are driving the results.23
In the upper panel, the dependent variable is the spread faced by the home team. Ac-
cording to our three measures of the racial di¤erences between the teams, we see that there
is a positive relationship between the spread and these measures. In the middle panel, the
dependent variable is the realized margin of the home team minus the spread. Based on the
three measures of the racial di¤erences between the teams, we see that there is a negative
relationship between the blackness of the team and the realized margin minus spread. In the
lower panel, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the home team
beats the spread and zero otherwise. Again, according to our three measures of the racial
di¤erences between the teams, we nd a negative relationship between the blackness of the
team and the probability that they cover the spread.
To summarize, we nd evidence that teams that are more black tend to face a larger point
spread and that these teams perform worse against the spread. The evidence so far supports
part of the conjecture we introduced at the beginning: point spreads, even as they control
for all relevant and available information about the two teams, are disproportionately higher
for more black teams. This suggests a bias towards betting on more black teams. With an
auxiliary assumption that bettors are expected value maximizers, we can infer that bettors
think that more black teams are better.
22We have also conducted the analysis without the team-season interactions. Our results are robust to
this specication and are available from the corresponding authors upon request.
23The results presented in the tables are estimated using probit when the dependent variable is a binary
variable, e.g., the probability of beating the spread. To ensure that the results do not su¤er from the
incidental parameters problem, we also estimate these specications using ordinary least squares. The sign
and signicance of the coe¢ cients of interest are indeed robust to the choice of estimation method. The
reported standard errors are robust to the usual sources of misspecication provided that the observations
are independent, as likely to be the case in our setting. In any case, we also conrm the signicance of the
results allowing for intragroup correlation across teams and seasons.
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4.3 Robustness checks and alternate explanations
How robust are our results? We perform several robustness checks where we investigate
plausible alternate explanations. One concern is that our results no longer hold when we
also account for the racial composition of the referee crew. For instance, Larsen, Price, and
Wolfers (2008) nd that the racial composition of the referee crew, together with the racial
composition of the teams, is relevant and can a¤ect the probability of a team winning the
game and, hence, beating the spread. We perform a series of regressions with the dependent
variable as the probability of beating the spread, however, we restrict attention to the following
categories: an all-white crew, a crew with at least one black referee, a crew with at least one
white referee, and an all-black crew. We also consider the case where the crew is neither all
black nor all white. Finally, we add the proportion of white referees as an additional control
variable in our baseline specication. Table 4a presents the results of these regressions. Even
when accounting for the racial composition of the referee crew, our results remain signicant
in each case, with the exception of an all-black crew. However, note that an all-black crew is
an extremely rare occurrence as it accounts for only 126 games out of 14,694 in our sample.
Hence, in the majority of the games in our sample, it holds that the more black team is less
likely to beat the spread.
Second, our results might not survive if performance criteria of the teams or the factors that
may be a¤ecting each teams performance against specic opponents are explicitly included in
the specication. Here we include the di¤erence in the records of the team and the di¤erence
in the recent performance of the teams. These variables could be regarded as a measure
of popularity, since teams with better records and better recent performance are likely to be
more popular. Additionally, there are possibly match-up issues when specic teams play each
other. Therefore, we also include specications that capture these possibilities. Another
issue could be that bookmakers correct any systemic mistakes that might occur in setting the
spread as the same two teams face each other again. Table 4b presents the results obtained
when the di¤erence in the records and recent performance (the number of games the team
won out of the last ve games played) of the teams are added to the specication. Table 4b
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also presents specications that account for the margin of the previous match of the teams,
the spread of the previous match, and match-specic xed e¤ects. Our nding that more
black teams have a lower probability of beating the spread is robust to these specications.
Whereas the previous analysis showed that di¤erences in popularity (as measured by recent
or overall success) and match-specic issues could not explain our results, there remain several
other plausible alternate explanations for our results. Here we include specications with two
additional measures of the di¤erence in popularity, a measure of the di¤erence in star power,
and the di¤erence in the number of foreign players.24 In particular, we measure the di¤erence
in popularity as the di¤erence between the number of nationally televised games within the
season and the di¤erence in home attendance within the season. We measure the di¤erence
in star power as the di¤erence in the number of players selected to the all-star team within
the season. Finally, we include the di¤erence in the number of players on the roster who are
not U.S. citizens.25 These specications are shown in Table 4c. Our nding that the more
black team has a lower probability of beating the spread is robust to these specications.26
4.4 Biased bettors or biased bookmakers?
A natural question then is, what is driving the relationship between the racial composition
of the teams and the performance against the spread? There are two main competing
hypotheses. The rst hypothesis is that the bookmakers are aware of the racial bias of
bettors and they set the spread in order to exploit the bias à la Levitt (2004). The second
hypothesis is that the bookmakers are unaware of the bias of the bettors and set the spread
to be the expected nal score of the game. In this case, the biased point spread is caused by
24See Eschker, Perez, and Siegler (2004), Yang and Lin (2012), and Ho¤er and Freidel (2014) for papers
that investigate whether foreign players, all things equal, earn less than non-foreign players.
25We dene foreign players as those that are reported to be non-U.S. citizens in the source websites. Note
that this designation may or may not correspond to the popular perception that the player is foreign. When
a foreign-born player gets citizenship, he would be coded as non-foreign. On the other hand, a U.S.-born
player may choose to change his nationality and play for another national team and he would be coded as
foreign.
26We do not report additional regressions involving the race of the coaches and the racial composition of
the location of the teams. Again, our results are robust to these specications and are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
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bettors who systematically bet on the more black team, thus moving the spread. In order to
distinguish between these hypotheses, we investigate whether there is a relationship between
the movement of the spread and the racial composition of the teams. Before we proceed, we
conrm that the movement of the spread is normally distributed with a mean of zero.27
Table 5a presents the results of our regressions involving the movement of the spread.28 In
our rst specication, we do not account for team- and season-specic factors, or team-season
interaction terms. There we nd a signicant relationship between race and the movement of
the spread. However, for the three specications in which we account for these xed e¤ects,
we do not nd a signicant relationship between the race of the teams and movement of the
spread. This evidence favors the explanation that the bookmakers, rather than the betting
of the bettors, are responsible for the biased point spread.
Now we investigate the relationship between the fraction of money bet and the racial
composition of the teams. As shown in Figure 1, there appears to be more money bet on
the home team if it has more black players than the visiting team. To further explore this
point, we conduct an econometric analysis to test this conjecture. We also account for other
alternate explanations, such as whether there is a di¤erence in the teams considered to be hot,
whether there is a di¤erence in the popularity of the teams, and whether there is a di¤erence
in the star power of the teams. Table 5b shows the results of this exercise.
There appears to be a positive, albeit statistically weak, relationship between the racial
composition of the team and the fraction of money bet on the home team. In other words, the
spread is set in a way that the resulting bets are skewed in favor of the more black team. Note
that the well-known home court advantage is already embedded in the left-hand-side variable.
Additionally, when we also account for other known biases, measured by recent performance,29
nationally televised games, and all-star players, the racial bias remains signicant.30 Based
27This is available from the corresponding author upon request.
28In the remainder of the tables, for the sake of brevity, we only show the results involving the di¤erence
in black starters. The results are virtually identical when the other two metrics are used and are available
from the authors upon request.
29We admit to being surprised at the signicant, negative coe¢ cient of the recent performance variable.
One possibility is that bookmakers excessively adjust the spread of a team currently performing well, so that
many bettors take the contrary position.
30In unreported regressions, we use other measures: winning record and average home attendance. The
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on the regressions in Tables 5a and 5b, we favor the explanation that bookmakers are aware
of the bias of bettors and set the spread to exploit this bias.
4.5 Prot opportunities
So far, we have presented evidence that there is a negative relationship between the relative
blackness of a team and its probability of beating the spread. The question then is whether
there are protable strategies that consistently yield returns over the break-even hurdle. Ac-
counting for the cost of betting, the break-even hurdle requires a winning percentage higher
than 52.4 percent. We consider three simple strategies in Table 6: betting on the team
with more black players, betting on the team with more white players, and betting on the
home team only when it has more white players than the visiting team.31 The reason for
distinguishing between the home and visiting team is to exploit the possibility that the home
court advantage may not be fully accounted for by the bettors. Betting on the whiter team,
regardless of location, yields a winning percentage of 51.7 with a return of -1.3 percent. For
the case where we consider betting on both home and visiting teams, we must restrict atten-
tion to teams with at least two fewer black starters. Here we observe a winning percentage
of 53.1 percent with a return of 1.3 percent. However, if we restrict attention to betting
on the whiter home team, then we do not need to consider the size of the di¤erence in the
composition of the starters. Here, betting on the whiter team yields a winning percentage of
53.3 percent with a return of 3.6 percent.
Across seasons, the prots obtained by following the "bet on the white home team" strat-
egy are persistent over time. Table 7 presents the results of adopting this strategy over our
whole sample period. In the 2007-08 season, as a result of the strategy of only betting on
the home team when it has 1, 2, 3, or 4 more white players in the starting line-up than the
visiting team, we observe the probability of a winning bet to be as high as 75 percent and net
returns (accounting for the cost of betting) ranging from 8 percent to 43 percent. Indeed,
results are similar to the ones reported here and are available from the corresponding author upon request.
31One could, of course, design betting strategies based on the roster of the teams or the minutes played
by black players. We obtain similar results using such strategies but prefer the results involving the black
starters because this is the most easily-accessible and least computationally-intensive variable.
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this strategy of betting on the home team, when it has more white players, delivers positive
net returns that not only increase with the starkness of the racial di¤erence between the two
teams but also broadly persist from one season to the next. This suggests that, although
learning opportunities abound in this incentivized setting, the bettors are biased for betting
on the team with more black players. Further given the auxiliary assumption that bettors are
expected value maximizers, this is indicative of a persistent and mistaken belief that teams
with more black players are better.32
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of the stereotype of the black basketball star on nancial
decisions, as revealed in the market outcomes, using evidence from the basketball betting
market. We nd that teams with more black players face higher point spreads and these
teams perform worse against the spread. We nd evidence that these biased point spreads are
being set by the bookmakers rather than the result of excessive betting on the teams with more
black players. We have explored many specications that account for alternate explanations
for our results. The racial bias that we nd survives these alternate specications. While
we are not able to rule out every possible non-racial explanation, we interpret our results
as evidence of a bias in NBA betting markets based on race. Further, with the auxiliary
assumption that bettors are expected value maximizers, our ndings can be interpreted as
indicating that bettors regard black teams as better.
Regardless of whether the racial bias that we nd is monetary or non-monetary, our
ndings add to the literature showing the importance of biases in economic decision making
and market outcomes. In particular, we demonstrate that market makers process the available
information e¢ ciently but at the same time, when setting the prices, allow for the fact that
the participants have a (possibly subconscious) bias, which they do not correct, even though
not doing so leads to direct pecuniary losses. We also provide evidence that biases do indeed
32See Pope and Schweitzer (2011) for another example of a persistent bias in a setting with many possibly
correcting factors.
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carry over from audit studies and laboratory experiments to real markets, even when stakes
are high and the agents have the opportunity to learn.
What do these ndings mean for other markets? If we nd persistently-mistaken, nancially-
disadvantageous beliefs in a market with obviously- and immediately-realized nancial costs
and many opportunities to learn, then we would expect there to be such in other markets
barring the limitation that participants in sports betting markets may be markedly di¤erent
than those in other markets. Most straightforwardly, do presumptions about intellectual or
athletic ability based on stereotypes increase or decrease the odds of success for certain groups
in certain elds? Another socially and politically uncomfortable question that may arise from
this analysis is, if people are prone to making suboptimal sports betting decisions due to racial
stereotypes, do people make similar costly judgment errors in other economic decisions? For
instance, are employers more likely to hire engineers with a background from a particular
region, expressing a bias that these individuals have an innate ability for quantitative tasks?
Is provision of health, education, and other social services a¤ected by subconscious attitudes
towards groups? These and other interesting questions are left for future research.
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Difference in black starters
Figure 1: Percent of money bet on the home team and the di¤erence in black starters.
Notes: The actual values of the di¤erence in black starters are discrete. The line shown is
continuous because it is constructed using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS). See
Cleveland (1979) for details on the LOWESS methodology.
28
Table 1. Summary Statistics at Team-Game Level
Obs Mean St. Dev.
Point spread 14785 -1.86 5.07
Realized margin 17178 3.36 14.15
Realized margin - spread 14785 0.35 11.53
Probability of beating the spread 14785 0.51 0.50
Black starters 17179 3.90 1.05
Di¤erence in black starters 17178 0.01 1.41
Black players on the roster 17179 7.60 1.63
Di¤erence in black players on the roster 17178 -0.01 2.12
Black minutes 17022 0.78 0.16
Di¤erence in black minutes 16982 0.001 0.21
Notes: Point spread is the quoted spread on a game as of the closing time for bets, expressed
from the home teams perspective. Realized margin is the actual di¤erence between the home team
score and the visiting team score at the end of the game. Probability of beating the spread is a
dummy that is 1 if a bet on the home team wins. Black starters is the number of black players in
the starting line-up. Black players on the roster is the number of black players on the team roster.
Black minutes is the proportion of minutes played by black players to the total minutes in the game,
calculated over the past ve games the team has played. These measures of blackness of a team
refer to the home team. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number of black players
in the starting line-up (number of black players on the roster, proportion of black minutes) of the
home team minus the number of black players in the starting line-up (number of black players on
the roster, proportion of black minutes) of the visiting team.
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Table 2. Winning the Game
Realized margin
Di¤erence in black starters 0.290***
[0.105]
Di¤. in black players on the roster 0.091
[0.066]
Di¤erence in black minutes -4.356***
[0.675]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes
Observations 17178 17178 16982
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14
Probability of winning
Di¤erence in black starters -0.023***
[0.009]
Di¤. in black players on the roster -0.029***
[0.006]
Di¤erence in black minutes -0.399***
[0.065]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes
Observations 17178 17178 16982
Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the realized margin in the game, computed
as the home team score minus the visiting team score. The dependent variable in the lower panel
is the probability of winning, which is a dummy that is 1 if the home team won the game. The
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares for the realized margin, and using probit for
the probability of winning. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number of black players
in the starting line-up (number of black players on the roster, proportion of black minutes over the
past ve games) of the home team minus the number of black players in the starting line-up (number
of black players on the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) of the visiting
team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3. Beating the Spread
Point spread
Di¤erence in black starters 0.364***
[0.032]
Di¤. in black players on the roster 0.143***
[0.021]
Di¤erence in black minutes 3.161***
[0.224]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes
Observations 14784 14784 14631
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.33
Realized margin - spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.239***
[0.083]
Di¤. in black players on the roster -0.275***
[0.053]
Di¤erence in black minutes -1.427**
[0.596]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes
Observations 14784 14784 14631
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.021**
[0.009]
Di¤. in black players on the roster -0.033***
[0.006]
Di¤erence in black minutes -0.116*
[0.066]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes
Observations 14784 14784 14631
Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the point spread quoted on the game,
expressed from the home teams perspective. The dependent variable in the middle panel is the
di¤erence between the realized margin (the nal score of the home team minus the nal score of the
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visiting team) and the point spread. The dependent variable in the lower panel is the probability of
beating the spread, which is a dummy that is 1 if a bet on the home team wins. The regressions are
estimated using ordinary least squares for the point spread and the di¤erence between the realized
margin and the spread, and using probit for the probability of beating the spread. Di¤erence in
black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the starting line-up (number of black
players on the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) of the home team minus
the number of black players in the starting line-up (number of black players on the roster, proportion
of black minutes over the past ve games) of the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square
brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4a. Robustness: Referees
Probability of beating the spread
At least one black referee At least one white referee
Di¤erence in black starters -0.015* -0.022***
[0.011] [0.009]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 11244 14460
All-black crew All-white crew
Di¤erence in black starters -0.098 -0.044**
[0.128] [0.021]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 126 3464
Neither all-black Referee race
nor all-white crew as additional control
Di¤erence in black starters -0.017* -0.019**
[0.011] [0.009]
Proportion of white referees -0.150***
[0.046]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 10911 14694
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black starters on the home team minus the number of black starters on the visiting team.
The race composition of referees are taken into account by splitting the sample by the proportion
of black referees in the 3-person crew. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as
a control variable. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4b. Robustness: History of Teams
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.019** -0.023** -0.023** -0.026*** -0.033***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012]
Di¤erence in records 0.033***
[0.007]
Di¤erence in recent performance 0.041
[0.033]
Margin on the teamslast match 0.002**
[0.001]
Spread on the teamslast match 0.0001
[0.003]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes yes yes
Match xed e¤ects no no no no yes
Observations 14781 14631 14041 13437 13324
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black starters on the home team minus the number of black starters on the visiting team.
Di¤erence in records is calculated as the di¤erence between the number of wins the home team had
in a particular season prior to the game under consideration and the corresponding number for the
visiting team. Di¤erence in recent performance is calculated as the di¤erence between the number of
wins the home team had in a particular season over the ve previous games before the game under
consideration and the corresponding number for the visiting team. Margin on the teamslast match
is computed as the di¤erence between home teams score and the visiting teams score obtained
the last time the two teams played against each other (irrespective of the location and expressed
from the home teams perspective). Spread on the teamslast match is the point spread quoted on
the last game the two teams faced each other (irrespective of the location and expressed from the
home teams perspective). Note that the margin/spread is equal to the margin/spread from the last
match-up in the previous season when the game under consideration is the rst time the two teams
face each other in a given season. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4c. Robustness: Alternate explanations
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.022** -0.022** -0.020** -0.028***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006]
Di¤erence in popularity: televised games 0.052***
[0.017]
Di¤erence in popularity: attendance 0.002***
[0.001]
Di¤erence in all-star players 0.191***
[0.015]
Di¤erence in foreign players 0.011
[0.010]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes yes
Observations 14781 14781 14781 14781
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as
the number of black starters on the home team minus the number of black starters on the visiting
team. Di¤erence in popularity: televised games is calculated as the di¤erence between the number
of nationally televised games of the home team during the season and the corresponding value for
the visiting team. Di¤erence in popularity: attendance is the average home attendance of the home
team during the season minus the corresponding value for the visiting team. Di¤erence in all-star
players is calculated as the di¤erence between the number players selected for the all-star team in the
season for the home team and the corresponding value for the visiting team. Di¤erence in foreign
players is calculated as the di¤erence between the number of foreign players on the roster of the
home team and the corresponding value for the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square
brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5a. Moving the Point Spread
Closing spread - Opening spread
Di¤erence in black starters 0.014** 0.008 0.008 0.006
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Team xed e¤ects no yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects no no yes yes
Team-season interactions no no no yes
Observations 7977 7977 7977 7977
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Notes: The dependent variable is the di¤erence between the closing and opening values of the
spread on the game, showing how much the point spread moves from the start of betting until all
bets close. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Di¤erence in black starters is
calculated as the number of black starters on the home team minus the number of black starters on
the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5b. Bias in Bets
Money bet on home team
Di¤erence in black starters 0.285* 0.408* 0.412* 0.411*
[0.158] [0.227] [0.228] [0.228]
Di¤erence in recent performance -0.922***
[0.224]
Di¤erence in popularity: televised games 0.054
[0.035]
Di¤erence in all-star players -0.012
[0.020]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes yes
Observations 8011 8011 8011 8011
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the money bet on the home team, expressed as a percentage
of the total bets placed on the game. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares.
Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number of black starters on the home team minus the
number of black starters on the visiting team. Di¤erence in recent performance is calculated as the
di¤erence between the number of wins the home team had in a particular season over the prevous ve
games before the game under consideration and the number of corresponding wins for the visiting
team. Di¤erence in popularity: televised games is calculated as the di¤erence between the number
of nationally televised games of the home team during the season minus the corresponding value for
the visiting team. Di¤erence in all-star players is calculated as the di¤erence between the number
players selected for the all-star team in the season for the home team minus the corresponding value
for the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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